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Introduction
These days, we are confronted with cases of severe damage to the environment resulting from
human acts. The recent incident with the Erika resulted in a large contamination of the French
coast and the suffering and painful death of several hundred thousands sea birds and other
animals. This was by far not the first case of an oil spill at sea with terrible consequences for
the environment. Some years ago, a catastrophe of a different kind happened near the Doñana
nature reserve, in the South of Spain, when the breach of a dam containing a large amount of
toxic water caused enormous harm to the surrounding environment, including innumerable
protected birds. These and other similar events raise the question of who should pay for the
costs involved in the clean up of the pollution and the restoration of the damage. Should the
bill for this be paid by society at large, in other words, the tax payer, or should it be the
polluter who has to pay, in cases where he can be identified?
Also in relation to genetically modified products, there is serious public concern that these
may affect our health, or may have negative effects on the environment. This concern results
in a call for liability of responsible parties.
One way to ensure that better caution will be applied to avoid the occurrence of damage to the
environment, is indeed to impose liability on the party responsible for an activity that bears
risks of causing such damage. This means that, when such an activity really results in damage,
the party in control of the activity (the operator), who is the actual polluter, has to pay the
costs of repair.
This White Paper sets out the structure for a future EC environmental liability regime that
aims at implementing this polluter pays principle. It describes the key elements needed for
making such a regime effective and practicable.
The proposed regime should not only cover damage to persons and goods and contamination
of sites, but also damage to nature, especially to those natural resources that are important
from a point of view of the conservation of biological diversity in the Community (namely the
areas and species protected under the Natura 2000 network). So far, environmental liability
regimes in EU Member States do not yet deal with that.
Liability for damage to nature is a prerequisite for making economic actors feel responsible
for the possible negative effects of their operations on the environment as such. So far,
operators seem to feel such responsibility for other people’s health or property – for which
environmental liability already exists, in different forms, at the national level - rather than for
the environment. They tend to consider the environment ‘a public good’ for which society as
a whole should be responsible, rather than an individual actor who happened to cause damage
to it. Liability is a certain way of making people realise that they are also responsible for
possible consequences of their acts with regard to nature. This expected change of attitude
should result in an increased level of prevention and precaution.3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This White Paper explores various ways to shape an EC-wide environmental liability regime,
in order to improve application of the environmental principles in the EC Treaty and
implementation of EC environmental law, and to ensure adequate restoration of the
environment. The background includes a Commission Green Paper in 1993, a Joint Hearing
with the European Parliament that year, a Parliament Resolution asking for an EC directive
and an Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee in 1994, and a Commission decision
in January 1997 to produce a White Paper. Several Member States have expressed support for
Community action in this field, including some recent comments on the need to address
liability relating to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Interested parties have been
consulted throughout the White Paper's preparation.
Environmental liability makes the causer of environmental damage (the polluter) pay for
remedying the damage that he has caused. Liability is only effective where polluters can be
identified, damage is quantifiable and a causal connection can be shown. It is therefore not
suitable for diffuse pollution from numerous sources. Reasons for introducing an EC liability
regime include improved implementation of key environmental principles (polluter pays,
prevention and precaution) and of existing EC environmental laws, the need to ensure
decontamination and restoration of the environment, better integration of environment into
other policy areas and improved functioning of the internal market. Liability should enhance
incentives for more responsible behaviour by firms and thus exert a preventive effect,
although much will depend on the context and details of the regime.
Possible main features of a Community regime are outlined, including: no retroactivity
(application to future damage only); coverage of both environmental damage (site
contamination and damage to biodiversity) and traditional damage (harm to health and
property); a closed scope of application linked with EC environmental legislation:
contaminated sites and traditional damage to be covered only if caused by an EC regulated
hazardous or potentially hazardous activity; damage to biodiversity only if protected under the
Natura 2000 network; strict liability for damage caused by inherently dangerous activities,
fault-based liability for damage to biodiversity caused by a non-dangerous activity;
1
commonly accepted defences, some alleviation of the plaintiffs' burden of proof and some
equitable relief for defendants; liability focused on the operator in control of the activity
which caused the damage; criteria for assessing and dealing with the different types of
damage; an obligation to spend compensation paid by the polluter on environmental
restoration; an approach to enhanced access to justice in environmental damage cases; co-
ordination with international conventions; financial security for potential liabilities, working
with the markets.
Different options for Community action are presented and assessed: Community accession to
the Council of Europe's Lugano Convention; a regime covering only transboundary damage; a
Community recommendation to guide Member State action; a Community directive; and a
sectoral regime focusing on biotechnology. Arguments for and against each option are given,
with a Community directive seen as the most coherent. A Community initiative in this field is
justified in terms of subsidiarity and proportionality, on grounds including the insufficiency of
separate Member State regimes to address all aspects of environmental damage, the
integrating effect of common enforcement through EC law and the flexibility of an EC
framework regime which fixes objectives and results, while leaving to Member States the
1 See a schematic view of the possible scope of the regime in the annex to this summary.4
ways and instruments to achieve these. The impact of an EC liability regime on the EU
industry’s external competitiveness is likely to be limited. Evidence on existing liability
regimes was reviewed and does suggest that their impact on national industry’s
competitiveness has not been disproportionate. The effects on SMEs and financial services
and the important question of insurability of core elements of the regime are dealt with.
Effectiveness of any legal liability regime requires a workable financial security system based
on transparency and legal certainty with respect to liability. The regime should be shaped in
such a way as to minimise transaction costs.
The White Paper concludes that the most appropriate option would be a framework directive
providing for strict liability for damage caused by EC regulated dangerous activities, with
defences, covering both traditional and environmental damage, and fault-based liability for
damage to biodiversity caused by non-dangerous activities. The details of such a directive
should be further elaborated in the light of consultations. The EU institutions and interested
parties are invited to discuss the White Paper and to submit comments by 1 July 2000.5
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The aim of this White Paper
According to Article 174(2) of the EC Treaty:
“Community policy on the environment shall be (…) based on the precautionary
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”
The purpose of this White Paper is to explore how the polluter pays principle can best
serve these aims of Community environmental policy, keeping in mind that avoiding
environmental damage is the main aim of this policy.
Against this background, the paper explores how a Community regime on environmental
liability can best be shaped in order to improve the application of the environmental
principles of the EC Treaty and to ensure restoration of damage to the environment. The
White Paper also explores how an EC environmental liability regime can help to improve
the implementation of Community environmental law, and examines the possible
economic effects of such a Community action.
1.2. The structure of the White Paper
After an introductory part containing some background information and explaining the
aim of environmental liability in sections 1 and 2, the White Paper presents the case for
an EC regime in section 3. Section 4 contains some possible features of a Community
regime and section 5 considers and compares different options for such a regime.
Whereas section 6 considers the issue from the perspective of subsidiarity and
proportionality, section 7 examines the economic impact of an EC environmental liability
regime. Section 8, finally, draws a conclusion and sets out the next steps in this matter.
1.3. Background and institutional context
1.3.1. The Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage
In May 1993 the Commission published its Green Paper on Remedying Environmental
Damage
2. Over 100 comments were submitted, from Member States, industry,
environment groups and other interested parties, followed up by continuous
consultations. A Joint Public Hearing was held by the Parliament and the Commission in
November 1993.
1.3.2. The position of the European Parliament
In April 1994, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution, calling on the Commission
to submit "a proposal for a directive on civil liability in respect of (future) environmental
damage"
3. In that Resolution, the Parliament applied for the first time Article 192(2) (ex-
2 Communication of 14 May 1993 (COM(93)47 final) presented to the Council, the Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee.
3 Resolution of 20.4.94 (OJ C 128/165).10
Article 138b(2) EC Treaty, which enables it to ask the Commission to submit legislative
proposals. Since then, the issue of environmental liability has been raised by the
Parliament on several occasions, such as the Commission’s annual working programmes,
in parliamentary questions and in letters to the Commission.
In its Questionnaire to the candidate Commissioners in view of their Hearings, the
Parliament again raised this question and expressed once more its view that Community
legislation in this field is urgently needed. It stressed in particular the need to insert
liability provisions in existing Community legislation in the field of biotechnology.
1.3.3. The Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
A detailed Opinion on the Green Paper was issued by the Economic and Social
Committee on 23 February 1994, which supported EC action on liability for
environmental damage, suggesting that this could take the form of a framework directive
on the basis of Treaty Articles 174 and 175 (ex-Articles 130r and 130s)
4.
1.3.4. Commission’s decision for a White Paper
Following an orientation debate on 29 January 1997, the Commission decided, taking
into account the need to reply to the Resolution from the European Parliament of 1994
asking for Community action, that a White Paper on environmental liability should be
prepared.
5
1.3.5. Member States’ positions
A number of Member States have expressed, informally or formally, a favourable
opinion with respect to Community action in the field of environmental liability in
general (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Sweden). Several Member States are known to be awaiting the Commission’s proposals
before embarking on national legislation in this field, especially with respect to liability
for damage to biodiversity. Furthermore, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden have recently declared in Council that they welcome the
Commission’s intention, in the context of the forthcoming White Paper on liability, to
assess the question of liability for environmental damage linked to the deliberate release
and placing on the market of GMOs. The UK has recently called upon the Commission
as a matter of priority to consider the feasibility of and possible criteria for a liability
regime or regimes to cover the release and marketing of GMOs. The positions of the
other Member States are not yet clear.
1.3.6. The consultation process
During the process of preparing the White Paper, consultations have been held with
independent experts from the Member States, with national experts from the Member
States and with interested parties, many of whom have also sent written comments in
relation to informal working papers that they received in the course of the process. The
views expressed were quite different, among other things with respect to the need for
4 ESC Opinion of 23.2.94 (CES 226/94).
5 Four studies have been conducted for the purpose of the preparation of an EC policy in this area.
Summaries of these studies are available to the public.11
Community action. A summary report of the comments from interested parties is
available on request.
2. WHAT IS ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY?
2.1. The aim of environmental liability
Environmental liability aims at making the causer of environmental damage (the
polluter) pay for remedying the damage that he has caused.
Environmental regulation lays down norms and procedures aimed at preserving the
environment. Without liability, failure to comply with existing norms and procedures
may merely result in administrative or penal sanctions. However, if liability is added to
regulation, potential polluters also face the prospect of having to pay for restoration or
compensation of the damage they caused.
2.2. The types of environmental damage for which liability is suited
Not all forms of environmental damage can be remedied through liability. For the latter
to be effective:
· there need to be one (or more) identifiable actors (polluters)
· the damage needs to be concrete and quantifiable, and
· a causal link needs to be established between the damage and the identified
polluter(s).
Therefore, liability can be applied, for instance, in cases where damage results from
industrial accidents or from gradual pollution caused by hazardous substances or waste
coming into the environment from identifiable sources.
However, liability is not a suitable instrument for dealing with pollution of a widespread,
diffuse character, where it is impossible to link the negative environmental effects with
the activities of certain individual actors. Examples are effects of climate change brought
about by CO2 and other emissions, forests dying as a result of acid rain and air pollution
caused by traffic.
3. THE CASE FOR AN EC ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY REGIME AND ITS EXPECTED
EFFECTS
3.1. Implementing the key environmental principles of the EC Treaty
Environmental liability is a way of implementing the main principles of environmental
policy enshrined in the EC Treaty (Article 174(2)), above all the polluter pays principle.
If this principle is not applied to covering the costs of restoration of environmental
damage, either the environment remains un-restored or the State, and ultimately the
taxpayer, has to pay for it. Therefore, a first objective is making the polluter liable for the
damage he has caused. If polluters need to pay for damage caused, they will cut back
pollution up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement exceeds the compensation
avoided. Thus, environmental liability results in prevention of damage and in12
internalisation of environmental costs.
6 Liability may also lead to the application of more
precaution, resulting in avoidance of risk and damage, as well as it may encourage
investment in R & D for improving knowledge and technologies.
3.2. Ensuring decontamination and restoration of the environment
In order to make the polluter pays principle really operational, Member States should
ensure effective decontamination and restoration or replacement of the environment in
cases where there is a liable polluter, by making sure that the compensation which he has
t op a yw i l lb ep r o p e r l ya n de f f e c t i v e l yu s e dt ot h i se f f e c t .
3.3. Boosting the implementation of EC environmental legislation
If liability exerts the preventive effect described earlier and restoration is ensured when
damage does occur, it should also improve compliance with EC environmental
legislation. Therefore, the link between the provisions of the EC liability regime and
existing environmental legislation is of great importance. Whereas most Member States
have introduced national laws that deal with strict liability for damage caused by
activities that are dangerous to the environment in one way or another, these laws are
very different in scope and often do not cover in a consistent way all damage caused by
activities that are known to bear a hazard for the environment. Moreover, these liability
regimes are only operational with respect to damage to human health or property, or
contaminated sites. Generally, they are not applied to damage to natural resources. It is
therefore important that an EC environmental liability regime should also cover damage
afflicted upon natural resources, at least those that are already protected by EC law,
namely under the Wild Birds and Habitats Directives, in the designated areas of the
Natura 2000 network
7. Member States should ensure the restoration of damage to these
protected natural resources in any event, also in cases where a liability regime could not
be applied (for instance, if the polluter cannot be identified), since this is an obligation
under the Habitats Directive. The preventive effects of liability should have a ‘boosting’
effect in an enlarged Union, thus facilitating the implementation of environmental rules
by new Member States..
3.4. Bringing about better integration
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced in Article 6 of the EC Treaty the principle that
environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and
implementation of other Community policies and activities. An EC environmental
liability regime covering all Community-regulated activities bearing a risk for the
environment (see 4.2.2 for activities to be covered) will bring about a better integration
of environmental considerations in the different sectors concerned through the
internalisation of environmental costs.
6 Internalisation of environmental costs means that the costs of preventing and restoring
environmental pollution will be paid directly by the parties responsible for the damage rather than
being financed by society in general.
7 Council Directives 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 103 p. 1, and 92/43/EEC
on the conservation of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, p. 7.13
3.5. Improving the functioning of the internal market
Even if the main objectives of a Community regime are of an environmental nature, it
may also contribute to creating a level playing field in the internal market. This is
important since most of EU trade takes place within the internal market, i.e. intra-EU
trade is more significant than extra-EU trade for Member States, and therefore
differences in the legal framework and costs faced by companies in the internal market
matter more than differences vis-à-vis third countries.
Currently, the existence of any problem of competition in the internal market caused by
differences in Member States’ environmental liability approaches is still unclear. This
may be because national environmental liability systems in the EU are relatively new and
have yet to become totally operational.
However, most existing Member States’ environmental liability regimes do not cover
damage to biodiversity. The economic impact of the latter could conceivably be
significantly higher than the impact resulting from existing national liability laws and
reach thresholds where concerns about the competitiveness of firms established in one
Member State would advise the national authorities to wait for an EU initiative and
refrain from imposing unilaterally liability for biodiversity. If so, this would justify EU
action also on the grounds of ensuring a level playing field in the internal market.
The considerations above suggest that an EU liability regime should also be designed
with a view to minimising possible impacts on the EU industry’s external
competitiveness
8 - an issue which is discussed specifically in section 7. This is one
reason for applying a step-by-step approach when introducing a Community regime (see
also section 6).
3.6. Expected effects
It follows from what is said in paragraph 3.1 on implementing the polluter pays, the
preventive and precautionary principles, that it is expected that liability creates incentives
for more responsible behaviour by firms. However, a number of conditions need to be
met for this effect to happen. For instance, experience with the US Superfund legislation
(liability for cleaning up contaminated sites) shows the need to avoid loopholes for
circumventing liability by transferring hazardous activities to thinly capitalised firms
which become insolvent in the event of significant damage. If firms can cover themselves
against liability risk by way of insurance, they will not tend to resort to this perverse
route. Availability of financial security, such as insurance, is therefore important to
ensure that liability is environmentally effective, a concern that is discussed in section
4.9. Effectiveness of any legal liability regime requires a workable financial security
system, which means that financial security is available for the core elements constituting
the regime. Moreover, the effectiveness of liability for environmental damage (as
opposed to traditional damage) depends on the capacity of administrative and judicial
authorities to treat cases expeditiously, as well as proper means of access to justice
available to the public.
8 It should be pointed out in this regard that in the framework of environmental liability legislation,
which applies also to natural resource damage, the US applies border-adjusted taxes for the most
sensitive sectors, i.e. the oil and chemical industries.14
The overall effect of liability is therefore a function of the broader context and specific
design of the liability scheme.
4. POSSIBLE FEATURES OF ANEC ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY REGIME
This section provides a description of the possible main features of a Community regime.
All or some of these elements will have to be taken into account depending on the option
for further action that is chosen (see section 5).
4.1. No retroactivity
For reasons of legal certainty and legitimate expectations, the EC regime should only
work prospectively. Damage that becomes known after the entry into force of the EC
regime should be covered, unless the act or omission that resulted in the damage has
taken place before the entry into force. It should be left to the Member States to deal with
pollution from the past. They could establish funding mechanisms to deal with existing
contaminated sites or damage to biodiversity in a way which would best fit their national
situation, taking into account elements like the number of such sites, the nature of the
pollution and the costs of clean-up or restoration. In order to apply the principle of non-
retroactivity in a harmonised way, a definition of ‘past pollution’ will need to be given at
a later stage.
Some transaction costs associated with litigation concerning the cut-off point between
what is to be considered past pollution and pollution covered by the regime are to be
expected. However, a retroactive system would have significantly higher economic
impacts.
4.2. The scope of the regime
The scope of the regime has to be approached from two different angles: first, the types
of damage to be covered, and second, the activities, resulting in such damage, to be
covered. The following sub-paragraphs set out how this could be dealt with.
4.2.1. Damage to be covered
Environmental damage
As the regime concerns environmental liability, environmental damage should be
covered. This is not as self evident as it may seem: several national laws called
‘environmental liability law’ (or similar names) deal with traditional types of damage,
such as personal injury, or property damage, rather than with environmental damage as
such. Damage is covered by such laws, if it is caused by activities that are considered
dangerous for the environment, or if the damage is caused by effects that result in
(traditional) damage via the environment (for instance: pollution of air or water).
Examples of such legislation are the German Environmental Liability Act of 1990 and
the Danish Compensation for Environmental Damage Act of 1994. In some other
national laws, impairment of the environment is also covered, next to traditional damage,
but hardly any further rules are given to specify this notion.15
In this White Paper, two different types of damage are brought together under the
heading ‘environmental damage’, both of which should be covered under a Community
regime, namely:
a) Damage to biodiversity
b) Damage in the form of contamination of sites.
Most Member States have not yet started to explicitly cover biodiversity damage under
their environmental liability regimes. However, all Member States have laws or
programmes in place to deal with liability for contaminated sites. They are mostly
administrative laws aiming at cleaning up polluted sites at the cost of the polluter (and/or
others).
Traditional damage
To be coherent, it is important to cover also traditional damage, such as damage to health
or property, if it is caused by a dangerous activity as defined under the scope, since in
many cases traditional damage and environmental damage result from the same event.
Covering only environmental damage under the EC regime while leaving liability for
traditional damage entirely to the Member States might result in inequitable results (for
instance no or less remedies for health damage than for environmental damage caused by
one and the same incident). Moreover, human health - an important policy objective in its
own right - is an interest closely connected with environmental protection: Article 174(1)
of the EC Treaty states that Community policy on the environment shall contribute to
pursuit (among other things) of the objective of protecting human health.
4.2.2. Activities to be covered
The objective of nearly all national environmental liability regimes is to cover activities
9
that bear an inherent risk of causing damage. Many of such activities are currently
regulated by Community environmental legislation, or Community legislation that has an
environmental objective along with other objectives.
A coherent framework for the liability regime needs to be linked with the relevant EC
legislation on protection of the environment. In addition to ensuring restoration of the
environment where this is currently not possible, the liability regime would therefore also
provide extra incentives for a correct observation of national laws implementing
Community environmental legislation. An infringement of such legislation would not
only result in administrative or penal sanctions, but also, if damage results from it, in an
obligation on the causer (polluter) to restore the damage or pay compensation for the lost
value of the injured asset. This approach of a closed scope, linked with existing EC
legislation, moreover has the advantage of ensuring an optimal legal certainty.
The activities to be covered, with respect to health or property damage and contaminated
sites, could be those regulated in the following categories of EC legislation: legislation
which contains discharge or emission limits for hazardous substances into water or air,
legislation dealing with dangerous substances and preparations with a view (also) to
9 Dealing with substances that bear such an inherent risk is also referred to, in this paper, as
(dangerous) activities.16
protecting the environment, legislation with the objective to prevent and control risks of
accidents and pollution, namely the IPPC Directive and the revised Seveso II Directive,
legislation on the production, handling, treatment, recovery, recycling, reduction, storage,
transport, trans-frontier shipment and disposal of hazardous and other waste, legislation
in the field of biotechnology and legislation in the field of transport of dangerous
substances. In the further shaping of an EC initiative, the scope of activities will need to
be defined with more precision, for instance by setting up a list of all the pieces of
relevant EC legislation with which the liability regime should be linked. Moreover, some
of these activities, such as activities with respect to genetically modified organisms
(GMOs), are not dangerous per se, but have the potential, in certain circumstances, to
cause health damage or significant environmental damage. This could be the case, for
example, in the event of an escape from a high-level containment facility or from
unforeseen results of a deliberate release. For this reason it is considered appropriate for
such activities to come within the scope of a Community-wide liability regime. In these
cases, the precise definition of the regime, for instance the defences to be allowed, might
not be the same for all activities related to GMOs, but may have to be differentiated
according to the relevant legislation and the activities concerned.
An important factor to be taken into account with respect to biodiversity damage is the
existence of specific Community legislation to conserve biodiversity, namely the Wild
Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive. These directives establish a regime, to be
implemented through the Natura 2000 network, of special protection of natural resources,
namely those important for the conservation of biodiversity. They contain, among other
things, requirements that significant damage to protected natural resources should be
restored. These obligations are addressed to the Member States. The environmental
liability regime would provide the tool to make the polluter pay for the restoration of
such damage. Since the objective of the two directives is the protection of natural
resources concerned, irrespective of the activity that causes damage to them, and since
such resources are vulnerable and can therefore also rather easily be damaged by other
than inherently dangerous activities, a liability regime applicable to biodiversity damage
should also cover other than dangerous activities which cause significant damage in
protected Natura 2000 areas. However, the type of liability in this case should be
different from the liability applicable to damage caused by dangerous activities, as is
explained in 4.3.
4.3. The type of liability, the defences to be allowed and the burden of proof
Strict liability means that fault of the actor need not be established, only the fact that the
act (or the omission) caused the damage. At first sight, fault-based liability
10 may seem
more economically efficient than strict liability, since incentives towards abatement costs
do not exceed the benefits from reduced emissions. However, recent national and
international environmental liability regimes tend to be based on the principle of strict
liability, because of the assumption that environmental objectives are better reached that
way. One reason for this is that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to establish fault of the
defendant in environmental liability cases. Another reason is the view that someone who
is carrying out an inherently hazardous activity should bear the risk if damage is caused
by it, rather than the victim or society at large. These reasons argue in favour of an EC
10 Fault-based liability applies when an operator has acted wrongly intentionally, by negligence, or
by insufficient care. Such an act (or omission) may involve non-compliance with legal rules or
with the conditions of a permit, or may occur in any other form.17
regime based, as a general rule, on strict liability. As mentioned in 4.2.2, damage to
biodiversity should be covered by liability, whether it is caused by a dangerous activity
or not. It is proposed, however, to apply fault-based in stead of strict liability to such
damage if it is caused by a non-dangerous activity. Activities carried out in conformity
with measures implementing the Wild Birds and Habitats Directives which aim at
safeguarding biodiversity would not give rise to liability of the person carrying out the
activity, other than for fault. Such activities can for instance take place under an agri-
environmental contract in accordance with the Council Regulation on support for rural
development
11. The State will be responsible for restoration or compensation of
biodiversity damage caused by a non-dangerous activity, in case fault of the causer can
not be established.
In the framework of an environmental liability regime, consistency should be ensured
with other Community policies and measures implementing these policies.
The effectiveness of a liability regime depends not only on the basic character of the
regime but also on such elements as the allowed defences and the division of the burden
of proof. The positive effects of strict liability should therefore not be undermined by
allowing too many defences, or by an impossible burden of proof on the plaintiff.
Defences
Commonly accepted defences should be allowed, such as Act of God (force majeure),
contribution to the damage or consent by the plaintiff, and intervention by a third party
(an example of the latter defence is the case that an operator caused damage by an
activity that he conducted following a compulsory order given by a public authority).
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Several interested parties, in particular economic operators, have expressed the view that
a defence in relation to damage caused by releases authorised through EC regulations, for
state of the art and/or for development risk should also be allowed. For economic reasons
they need predictability regarding their liabilities to third parties, but the occurrence and
extent of these liabilities are subject to ongoing developments in any event (e.g. changes
in legislation and case law, medical progress, etc.). Defences like the ones mentioned
here are normally not allowed by existing national environmental liability regimes of EU
Member States. When deciding on these defences, all relevant impacts should be
considered, among others possible effects on SMEs (see also section 7).
Burden of proof
In environmental cases, it may be more difficult for a plaintiff and easier for a defendant
to establish facts concerning the causal link (or the absence of it) between an activity
carried out by the defendant and the damage. Therefore, provisions exist in several
national environmental liability regimes to alleviate the burden of proof concerning fault
or causation in favour of the plaintiff. The Community regime could also contain one or
other form of alleviation of the traditional burden of proof, to be more precisely defined
at a later stage.
11 Council Regulation no 1257/99 (OJ L160 p. 80).
12 Certain procedural aspects can also be relevant with a view to contesting liability, such as the lack
of jurisdiction of the court seized or questions of limitation.18
Application of equity
Circumstances might occur which would make it inequitable for the polluter to have to
pay the full compensation for the damage caused by him. Some room might be granted to
the court (or any other competent body, e.g. an arbiter) to decide - for instance in cases
where the operator who caused the damage can prove that this damage was entirely and
exclusively caused by emissions that were explicitly allowed by his permit - that part of
the compensation should be borne by the permitting authority, instead of the polluter.
Further criteria would need to be defined for such a provision, for instance that the liable
operator had done everything possible to avoid the damage.
4.4. Who should be liable?
The person (or persons) who exercise control of an activity (covered by the definition of
the scope) by which the damage is caused (namely the operator) should be the liable
party under an EC environmental liability regime
13. Where the activity is carried out by a
company in the form of a legal person, liability will rest on the legal person and not on
the managers (decision makers) or other employees who may have been involved in the
activity. Lenders not exercising operational control should not be liable.
4.5. Criteria for different types of damage
Different approaches are indicated to deal with the different types of damage. For
biodiversity damage, liability rules and criteria do not exist to any meaningful extent, so
therefore they need to be developed. With respect to liability for contaminated sites,
national laws and systems exist, but they are quite different. Traditional damage should
b ed e a l tw i t hi nac o h e r e n tw a yi nr e l a t i o nt ot h eo t h e r ,e n v i r o n m e n t a l ,f o r m so fd a m a g e ,
which can only be achieved if the fundamental rules are the same for each type of
damage.
4.5.1. Biodiversity damage
Since this area is not generally covered by Member State liability rules, an EC liability
regime could make a start with covering this kind of damage within the limits of existing
Community biodiversity legislation.
· Which biodiversity damage should be covered?
Damage to biodiversity, which is protected in Natura 2000 areas, based on the Habitats
and the Wild Birds Directives, should be covered. Such damage could take the form of
damage to habitats, wildlife or species of plants, as defined in the annexes to the
directives concerned.
· When should damage to biodiversity be covered?
13 However, Member States could make other parties liable also, on the basis of Article 176 EC
Treaty.19
T h e r es h o u l db eaminimum threshold for triggering the regime: only significant damage
should be covered. Criteria for this should be derived, in the first place, from the
interpretation of this notion in the context of the Habitats Directive
14.
· How to value biodiversity damage and ensure restoration at reasonable cost?
Economic valuation of biodiversity damage is of particular importance for cases where
damage is irreparable. But if restoration of damage is feasible, there also have to be
valuation criteria for the damaged natural resource, in order to avoid disproportionate
costs of restoration. A cost-benefit or reasonableness test will have to be undertaken in
each separate case. The starting point for such a test, for cases where restoration is
feasible, should be the restoration costs (including the costs of assessing the damage).
For valuing the benefits of the natural resource
15, a system needs to be elaborated for
which inspiration could be gathered from certain systems that exist or are being
developed at the regional level (e.g. Andalusia, Hessen).
If restoration is technically not or only partially possible, the valuation of the natural
resource has to be based on the costs of alternative solutions, aiming at the establishment
of natural resources equivalent to the destroyed natural resources, in order to re-establish
the level of nature conservation and biological diversity embodied in the Natura 2000
network.
Valuation of natural resources may be more or less expensive, depending on the method
used. Economic valuation methods, such as contingent valuation, travel cost and other
forms of revealed preference techniques that necessitate surveys involving a large
number of people can be expensive if carried out in every case. The use of ‘benefits
transfer’ techniques can however significantly reduce the cost. The development of
benefit transfer data bases, such as the Environmental Valuation Resource Inventory
(EVRI), which contain relevant valuation material, is particularly important. These data
bases can be used to provide a context to the problem and as a source of directly
comparable valuation.
· How to ensure a minimum level of restoration?
Restoration should aim at the return to the state of the natural resource before the damage
occurred. To estimate this state, historical data and reference data (the normal
characteristics of the natural resource concerned) could be used. Replication of the
quality and quantity of the natural resources will mostly not be possible, or only at
extreme cost. Therefore the aim should rather be to bring the damaged resources back to
a comparable condition, considering also factors such as the function and the presumed
future use of the damaged resources.
· The impact of damage to biodiversity on costs of prevention and restoration
Biodiversity damage, in the sense of this White Paper, may only occur in areas protected
under the Habitats and Wild Birds directives which, once the Natura 2000 network is
14 A Commission services document on the interpretation of this and other notions in the context of
article 6 Habitats Directive will be published shortly.
15 For instance the presence of the middle spotted woodpecker (see cover page), a protected species
under the Wild Birds Directive.20
established, is expected to cover up to around 10% of the EC territory. In these areas only
environmentally friendly activities may be carried out. This means that the bulk of
environmental damage to these areas may only be caused by plants operating dangerous
activities in neighbouring areas. But these plants are already covered by the other pillars
of the proposed regime which address damage in the form of traditional damage and
contamination of sites. It follows that the only additional cost for these activities due to
biodiversity coverage is the one related to prevention of damage to, and restoration of,
biodiversity according to the criteria foreseen in the White Paper.
Given that, as said, dangerous activities are not supposed to operate in protected areas,
biodiversity damage occurring there will only exceptionally be caused by IPPC industries
or large plants for which costs and competitiveness are a critical issue. Hence, the impact
of liability for biodiversity damage will be minimal for these industries. On the other
hand, the kind of environmentally friendly activities allowed to operate in the protected
areas are, by its very nature, likely to internalise cheaply the desired levels of prevention
and restoration.
4.5.2. Contaminated sites
Most Member States have special laws or programmes to deal with clean up of
contaminated sites, both old and new. The Community regime should aim at
implementing the environmental principles (polluter pays, prevention and precaution) for
new contamination and at a certain level of harmonisation with respect to clean-up
standards and clean-up objectives. For contaminated sites, the dangerous activities
approach would apply and the regime would be triggered only if the contamination is
significant. Contaminated sites include the soil, surface water and groundwater. Where
an area protected under the biodiversity legislation is part of a contaminated site, the
regime for biodiversity damage would apply to that area, in addition to the regime for
contaminated sites. This might mean that restoration of the natural resource has to be
carried out after decontamination of the site.
· Clean-up standards
These are standards to evaluate and decide whether clean up of a contaminated site is
necessary. As with biodiversity, only significant damage should be covered. The main
qualitative criterion for this will be: does the contamination lead to a serious threat to
man and the environment?
· Clean-up objectives
These should define the quality of soil and water at the site to be maintained or restored.
The main objective should be: removal of any serious threat to man and environment.
Acceptable thresholds would be determined according to best available techniques under
economically and technically viable conditions (as under the IPPC Directive). Another
objective should be, to make the soil fit for actual and plausible future use of the land.
These qualitative objectives should where possible be combined with quantified
numerical standards indicating the soil and water quality to be achieved. If clean up is not
feasible for economic or technical reasons, full or partial containment might be a
possibility.21
4.5.3 Traditional damage
The definition of traditional damage, namely personal and property damage and possibly
economic loss, will remain under the Member States’ jurisdiction. All the elements of the
regime dealt with in this paper should, however, also be applied to traditional damage,
with the exception of the specific rules on access to justice (4.7) and the specific criteria
for restoration and valuation of environmental damage (4.5.1 and 4.5.2). For traditional
damage, the EC regime should not introduce a notion of “significant damage”.
4.5.4 The relation with the Product Liability Directive
16
The Product Liability Directive deals with damage to persons and goods (i.e. traditional
damage) caused by a defective product, but it does not cover environmental damage.
Overlaps between the two liability regimes cannot be excluded in the field of traditional
damage. This could be the case for example when damage is caused by a product
containing dangerous substances which results in being a defective product due to a
higher presence of chemical substances than allowed under EC environmental legislation.
In such a case, the Product Liability Directive prevails as the legislation applicable when
compensation is sought for traditional damage.
17
4.6. Ensuring effective decontamination and restoration of the environment
An obligation common to biodiversity damage and contamination of sites should be that
damages or compensation paid by the polluter for restoration or clean up have to be
effectively spent for that purpose. If restoration of the damage is not or only partially
possible for technical or economic (cost-benefit) reasons, compensation mounting to the
value of the un-restored damage should be spent on comparable projects of restoring or
improving protected natural resources. Determination of comparable projects by the
competent authorities should depend on a thorough analysis of the environmental
benefits gained.
4.7. Access to justice
The case of damage to the environment is different from the case of traditional damage,
where victims have the right to raise a claim with competent administrative or judicial
bodies to safeguard their private interests. Since the protection of the environment is a
public interest, the State (including other parts of the polity) has the first responsibility to
act if the environment is or threatens to be damaged. However, there are limits to the
availability of public resources for this, and there is a growing acknowledgement that the
public at large should feel responsible for the environment and should under
circumstances be able to act on its behalf. The Commission has referred to the need for
such an enhanced access to justice in its Communication to the Council and Parliament
on ‘Implementing Community Environmental Law’
18.
16 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ 85, L 210, p.29),
amended by Directive 99/34/EC; OJ 99, L 141, p. 20.
17 The Commission has recently published a Green Paper on product liability, to gather information
on the actual application of the Directive and in order to initiate a debate about the possible need
for a substantial revision of the Directive.
18 COM(96)500 final. "Better access to courts for non-governmental organisations and individuals
would have a number of helpful effects in relation to the implementation of Community22
An important legal instrument in this field is the Århus Convention.
19 It includes specific
provisions on access to justice that form a basis for different actions by individuals and
public interest groups. These actions include: to challenge a decision of a public authority
before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law (the
right of administrative and judicial review), to ask for adequate and effective remedies,
including injunctions, and to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public
authorities which contravene environmental law
20. An EC environmental liability regime
could contribute to the implementation of the Convention in Community law, along the
following lines.
4.7.1. “Two tier approach”: the State should be responsible in the first place
Member States should be under a duty to ensure restoration of biodiversity damage and
decontamination in the first place (first tier), by using the compensation or damages paid
by the polluter. Public interest groups promoting environmental protection (and meeting
relevant requirements under national law) shall be deemed to have an interest in
environmental decision-making
21. In general, public interest groups should get the right
to act on a subsidiary basis, i.e. only if the State does not act at all or does not act
properly (second tier). This approach should apply to administrative and judicial review
a n dt oc l a i m sa g a i n s tt h ep o l l u t e r .
4.7.2. Urgent cases (injunctions, costs of preventive action)
In urgent cases, interest groups should have the right to ask the court for an injunction
directly in order to make the (potential) polluter act or abstain from action, to prevent
significant damage or avoid further damage to the environment. They should be allowed,
for this purpose, to sue the alleged polluter, without going to the State first. Injunctive
relief could aim at the prohibition of a damaging activity or at ordering the operator to
prevent damage before or after an incident, or at making him take measures of
reinstatement. It is up to the court to decide if an injunction is justified.
The possibility to bring claims for reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in taking
urgent preventive measures (i.e. to avoid damage or further damage) should be granted,
in a first instance, to interest groups, without them having to request action by a public
authority first.
4.7.3. Ensuring sufficient expertise and avoiding unnecessary costs
Only interest groups complying with objective qualitative criteria should be able to take
action against the State or the polluter. Restoration of the environment should be carried
environmental law. First, it will make it more likely that, where necessary, individual cases
concerning problems of implementation of Community law are resolved in accordance with the
requirements of Community law. Second, and probably more important, it will have a general
effect of improving practical application and enforcement of Community environmental law, since
potentially liable actors will tend to comply with its requirements in order to avoid the greater
likelihood of litigation." (p. 12).
19 UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, that has been adopted and signed, also by the
Community, at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Århus (Denmark), 23-25 June 1998.
20 Article 9 Århus Convention.
21 Article 2(5) Århus Convention.23
out in co-operation with public authorities and in an optimal and cost-effective way. The
availability of specific expertise and the involvement of independent and recognised
experts and scientists can play a fundamental role.
Since costs will inevitably be involved in making use of rights of access to justice, it
would be worthwhile to explore how out-of-court solutions, such as arbitration or
mediation, could be used in this context. Such solutions aim at saving time and costs.
4.8. The relation with international conventions
There are a growing number of international conventions and protocols dealing with
(environmental) liability in several fields. There is, for instance, a long standing body of
conventions and protocols concerning damage caused by nuclear activities, as well as in
the field of oil pollution at sea. A more recent convention deals with damage caused by
maritime transport of hazardous and noxious substances; Member States are currently
considering its possible ratification. All these conventions are based on a strict but
limited liability, and the concept of a second tier of compensation. In the case of oil
pollution, the second tier is a fund, fed jointly by the contributing oil companies in the
importing states, which compensates - also up to a certain limit - liabilities exceeding the
ship owners liability. In light of recent marine pollution accidents, it should be examined
if the international regime should be complemented by EC measures. The Commission
will prepare a Communication on oil tanker safety (June 2000) examining, inter alia, the
need for a complementary EC regime on liability for oil spills. Different options in this
regard will be examined, taking into account the specific character of the sector. More in
general, a future EC regime on environmental liability would have to clarify to which
extent there is room for application in those areas that are already covered by
international law.
4.9. Financial security
Insurability is important to ensure that the goals of an environmental liability regime are
reached.
Strict liability has been found to prompt spin-offs or delegation of risky production
activities from larger firms to smaller ones in the hope of circumventing liability. These
smaller firms, which often lack the resources to have risk management systems as
effective as their larger counterparts, often become responsible for a higher share of
damage than what their size would predict. When they cause damage, they are also less
likely to have the financial resources to pay for redressing the damage. Insurance
availability reduces the risks companies are exposed to (by transferring part of them to
insurers). They should therefore also be less inclined to try to circumvent liability
22.
Insurance availability for environmental risks, and in particular for natural resource
damage, is likely to develop gradually. As long as there are not more widely accepted
measurement techniques to quantify environmental damage, the amount of the liability
22 On the other hand, a company that is able to insure against the damages it can potentially cause to
natural resources still has an interest in behaving responsibly. This is so because, to get an
insurance policy, a company normally has to go through an environmental audit, is often required
to have an effective risk management system and, if insurance payments are required, must
frequently shoulder part of the bill.24
will be difficult to predict. However, the calculation of risk-related tariffs is important for
the fulfilment of liabilities under insurance contracts and insurance companies are
required to establish adequate technical provisions at all times. Developing qualitative
and reliable quantitative criteria for recognition and measurement of environmental
damage will improve the financial security available for the liability regime and
contribute to its viability, but this will not occur overnight and is likely to remain
expensive. This justifies a cautious approach in setting up the liability regime.
Capping liability for natural resource damages is likely to improve the chances of early
development of the insurance market in this field, though it would erode the effective
application of the polluter pays principle.
When looking at the insurance market - insurance being one of the possible ways of
having financial security, alongside, among others, bank guarantees, internal reserves or
sector-wise pooling systems - it appears that coverage of environmental damage risks is
still relatively undeveloped, but there is clear progress being made in parts of the
financial markets specialising in this area. One example is the development of new types
of insurance policies for the coverage of costs involved in the clean up of contaminated
sites, for instance in the Netherlands.
The insurability of environmental risks is essential for financial security but depends
considerably on the legal certainty and transparency provided by the liability regime. The
environmental liability regimes of nearly all Member States however, have not made
financial security a legal requirement. Where this has been done, for instance in the
German Environmental Liability Law, the implementation of the provision concerned has
run into difficulties, which have so far prevented the necessary implementing decree
from being established.
The concerns of the financial sectors are one reason for the step-by-step approach
mentioned in this paper (see section 6). The closed scope of dangerous activities, the
limitation to those natural resources which are already protected by existing Community
law and the limitation to significant damage are all aspects which contribute to making
the risks arising from the regime better calculable and manageable. Moreover, the EC
regime should not impose an obligation to have financial security, in order to allow the
necessary flexibility as long as experience with the new regime still has to be gathered.
The provision of financial security by the insurance and banking sectors for the risks
resulting from the regime should take place on a voluntary basis. The Commission
intends to continue discussions with these sectors in order to stimulate the further
development of specific financial guarantee instruments.
5. DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
A range of different options and instruments have been considered in the course of the
process of developing an approach to environmental liability. The main ones are
described in this section, as well as their advantages and disadvantages.
5.1. Community accession to the Lugano Convention
The Council of Europe Convention on civil liability for damage resulting from activities
dangerous for the environment was established in 1993. The Commission and all
Member States participated in the negotiations. The Convention contains a regime for25
environmental liability that covers all types of damage (both traditional damage such as
personal injury and property damage and impairment of the environment as such), when
caused by a dangerous activity. Dangerous activities in the field of dangerous substances,
biotechnology and waste are further defined. The scope is open in the sense that other
activities than the ones explicitly referred to may also be classified as dangerous. A
summary on the history, contents and signatories of this Convention is available to the
public.
Community accession to this Convention would have the advantage of being in
accordance with the subsidiarity principle at international level (new EC legislation
should not be established insofar as the matter concerned can be dealt with by
Community accession to an existing international convention). Moreover, the
Convention has a comprehensive coverage (all types of damage resulting from dangerous
activities) and a wide and open scope, which has the merit of presenting a coherent
system and of treating operators of all dangerous activities in the same way. Six Member
States
23 have signed the Convention whereas some others may be considering doing so.
Several Member States
24 have already prepared legislation to implement the Convention,
or are in the process of preparing ratification. However, some other Member States
25 do
not intend to sign or ratify it. The Convention is also open to accession by Central and
Eastern European countries, even by countries which are not members of the Council of
Europe, so that it could have an important international spread. Accession by the
Community could encourage other countries to accede.
Comparing the regime of the Lugano Convention with the environmental liability
regimes of the Member States, a general impression is that the Convention goes further
than most Member States in some respects (namely in that it explicitly covers
environmental damage as such). Its open scope of dangerous activities also goes further
than several Member States which have regimes with a closed and more limited scope.
These Member States, and most of industry, feel that the scope of Lugano is too wide and
gives too little legal certainty and that its definitions, especially in the field of
environmental damage, are too vague. The Convention does cover such damage, but in a
rather unspecific way. For instance, it does not require restoration nor does it give criteria
for restoration or economic valuation of such damage. Thus, if accession to the
Convention was envisaged, an EC act would be needed to supplement the Lugano regime
in order to bring more clarity and precision to this new area where liability is concerned.
5.2. A regime for transboundary damage only
Member States are increasingly aware of damage caused across their boundaries, not
least because of public sensitivity to pollution originating from another country.
Awareness of transboundary problems is likely to increase further as the implementation
of the Habitats Directive and Natura 2000 progress and it is found that many protected
areas straddle borders between Member States. Even if both pollution and immediate
damage to one of these areas are within one Member State, the damage may have
implications for other Member States as well, for instance by damaging the integrity of a
species or a habitat as a whole. Pollution of rivers or lakes also often has a transboundary
dimension.
23 Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal.
24 Austria, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal.
25 Denmark, Germany, UK.26
The main argument used in favour of a ‘transboundary only’ regime is that, on
subsidiarity grounds, there are insufficient arguments for applying a liability regime to
problems within one Member State, but that transboundary problems are indeed better
dealt with at EC level. Disadvantages are that a system that addresses only transboundary
problems would leave a serious gap where liability for biodiversity damage is concerned,
since this is not yet covered at all by most Member States. The important objective of
strengthening the application of Community environmental legislation could not be
reached by a regime which would not cover most of the potential infractions of such
legislation, namely all those taking place within one Member State. A ‘transboundary
only’ system would also lead to subjects being treated completely differently within one
Member State, since some, who happen to be involved in a case of transboundary
damage, could be liable under the EC ‘transboundary only’ regime, whereas others, who
are conducting the same activity in the same country and causing similar damage, could
walk free if the national regime happened not to cover such a case. This might even call
into question the legitimacy of such a regime under the principle of equal treatment as
developed in the case law of the European Court of Justice.
5.3. Member States action guided by a Community recommendation
This option, for instance a recommendation linked with existing Community legislation
relevant in this field, might have the support of those who are not convinced of the need
for a legally binding instrument. They might feel, for instance, that there is insufficient
evidence for Member State laws not being adequate enough for dealing with the relevant
environmental problems. A recommendation, being a non-binding instrument without
enforcement mechanisms, would bring less cost for operators but also less benefit for the
environment, among other things in cases of transboundary damage inside the
Community, than a binding instrument. Similar arguments would apply to the use of
environmental (voluntary) agreements in this context.
5.4. A Community directive
The main differences between a Community directive and Community accession to the
Lugano Convention are that the scope of Community action can be better delimited and
the regime for biodiversity damage can be better elaborated, in accordance with the
relevant Community legislation. Both differences result in more legal certainty than
provided by Lugano. It should be noted that, even if the Community does not accede to
the Lugano Convention, the latter can provide an important source of inspiration for a
future Community directive. As far as the application of a liability regime to non-EU
Member States is concerned, it is clear that a Community directive on environmental
liability would be taken into account in the enlargementprocess of the applicant
countries, whereas the situation in these countries with respect to environmental liability
would also be examined.
Comparing this type of Community action with the more limited and non-binding options
described in 5.2 and 5.3, the former is the option with higher added value in terms of a
better implementation of the EU environmental principles and law, and of effective
restoration of the environment.
5.5. Liability sector-wise, namely in the area of biotechnology
On several occasions the European Parliament has asked the Commission to insert
liability provisions into existing directives in the field of biotechnology. The option27
mentioned in 5.4 could be pursued by proposing more focused liability provisions
applicable to specific sectors (e.g. biotechnology), instead of a horizontal approach,
covering all (potentially) hazardous activities in an equal way.
A horizontal approach has the advantage of providing the general framework in a single
act. Provided that the activities covered pose similar environmental risks and raise
comparable economic issues, this approach would not only be more consistent but also
more efficient. A sector-wise approach would not ensure a coherent system or an equal
application of the polluter pays, preventive and precautionary principles to activities that
are comparable in the sense that they pose a risk to man and the environment. Moreover,
the objective of better implementation of all relevant pieces of Community
environmental legislation would not be reached if liability provisions were introduced
only in one specific area of legislation. Finally, it would be difficult to explain to a sector
why it should be singled out for being subject to liability provisions, different from other
sectors posing similar risks. For all these reasons, a horizontal environmental liability
regime is to be preferred.
6. SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
The EC Treaty requires Community policy on the environment to contribute to
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, and to protecting
human health (Article 174(1)). This policy must also aim at a high level of protection,
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It
shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principle that preventive action
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and
that the polluter should pay (Article 174(2)). All these principles, which are, according to
the wording of the Treaty (see italic) binding for the EC institutions, are currently not
being implemented in an optimal way throughout the Community. One reason for this is
that there is a gap in most Member States’ liability regimes as far as biodiversity damage
is concerned. (See in this context also section 3).
Moreover, national legislation can not effectively cover issues of transboundary
environmental damage within the Community, which may affect, among others,
watercourses and habitats, many of which straddle frontiers. Therefore, an EC-wide
regime is necessary in order to avoid inadequate solutions to transfrontier damage.
Member States apply different instruments to implement their environmental liability
rules. Some rely more on administrative or public law whereas others use civil law to a
larger extent. They all use a mixture of both. An EC regime should aim at fixing the
objectives and results, but the Member States should choose the ways and instruments to
achieve these.
In accordance also with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, an EC regime - to
be based on Article 175 of the Treaty - could be a framework regime containing essential
minimum requirements, to be completed over time with other elements which might
appear necessary on the basis of the experience gathered with its application during the
initial period (step-by-step approach).
In case the instrument for establishing the regime were to be a directive, a coherent
application of the system throughout the Community will be ensured through the
Commission’s monitoring of EC law and the case law of the European Court of Justice.28
7. THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AT EC
LEVEL
An EC regime along the lines of the White Paper would differ in significant respects
from existing regimes. Therefore, past experience is insufficient to support any strong
views on the overall economic impact of the EC regime, including its external
competitiveness impact. The Commission will continue its research in this area and
launch further studies on the economic and environmental impact of environmental
liability. The findings of these studies will be profoundly assessed and given due weight
in the preparation of the Commission’s future initiatives in this field. However, at this
point evidence on existing liability regimes offers a useful general analytical framework.
Available evidence on the overall impact of environmental regulation on industry
competitiveness suggests that no significant negative impact is discernible. There is also
available data on the impact of environmental liability regimes. The annual total clean up
costs, though excluding nature resource damage costs, of the retroactive
26 U.S. Superfund
represent some 5% of the total amount spent each year in the U.S. to comply with all
federal environmental regulations. No overall figures are available on costs with natural
resource damages for the US Superfund. For what concerns the environmental liability
regimes in place in Member States, available evidence suggests they have not led to any
significant competitiveness problems.
While we are unsure about the effects on external competitiveness of an EC liability
regime, it must be taken into consideration that most OECD countries have
environmental liability legislation of some kind. Therefore, an EU environmental liability
regime will not amount to the adoption by the EU of a unilateral standard of environment
protection
27
This does not mean that the international competitiveness of EU industry, and in
particular of export-oriented industries and of sectors facing significant competition from
imports, should not be safeguarded by all means possible. There are ways to offset
potential external competitiveness problems that might be raised by differences in
liability standards at international level compatible with world trade rules.
As to SMEs, they often cause more environmental damage than what their size would
predict , possibly due to a lack of resources. From this perspective they might experience
a more substantial impact. Undesirable side effects such as an increase in the share of
damage caused by SMEs could be mitigated by more targeted use of national or EC
support mechanisms aimed at facilitating adoption by SMEs of cleaner processes.
The proposed approach to liability protects economic operators in the financial sector
from liability unless they have operational responsibilities. Undesirable negative impacts
on this sector are therefore unlikely. Provided legal certainty with respect to liability and
26 The White Paper argues against retroactive liability that, all else the same, has higher cost
impacts.
27 In this context, it is relevant to note that most problems of competitiveness and delocalisation
present themselves among developed countries rather than between developing and developed
ones (a conclusion that is confirmed in the recent WTO study on trade and environment, Special
Studies, ‘Trade and the Environment’, WTO 1999). Then, since most OECD countries already
have environmental liability legislation of some kind, the impact on external competitiveness of
an EC liability regime is likely to be limited.29
transparency are assured, the impact, in particular on the insurance sector should be
positive over time, as experience is gained with the working of the regime and new
markets for insurance products emerge.
The effect of environmental liability on employment is also a relevant issue. Available
research on the overall impact of environmental regulation suggests that, while jobs in
particular industries may rise or fall, total employment will not be systematically
affected
28.
While there are no available empirical studies on the specific impact of environmental
liability on employment, it is clear that there might be some negative impacts as
enterprises shift from more environmentally damaging activities and processes to cleaner
ones. However, this impact is likely to be counterbalanced. The economic essence of
liability is that it provides incentives to increased levels of prevention. It is therefore to
be expected that employment in industries providing and using clean technologies and
related services will benefit from environmental liability. As insurance for natural
resource damage develops, more jobs should also be created in this sector.
The key concept here is sustainable development taking into account in a balanced way,
the economic, social and environmental dimensions.
Finally, it must be recalled that the use of policy instruments generates often costs even if
they yield a net benefit. Minimisation of costs associated with pre-determined goals is
therefore necessary to pursue.
In the case of liability, transaction costs, i.e. the costs of reaching and enforcing rules, is a
matter of specific consideration. Three cases can be mentioned in this respect. First, the
case of the US, where litigation is admittedly more widespread than in Europe, and
where liability laws have entailed high transaction costs, mainly legal fees, to the tune of
20% of total enforcement and compensation costs. Secondly, for the strict environmental
liability systems in the Member States, there is no evidence that they have given raise to
an increase of claims or transaction costs. Finally, there is the experience in the
Community with the introduction of the Product Liability Directive (see footnote 9). A
study report on the first period of application of this directive did not find any significant
increase in the number or pattern of claims. It can be concluded from this that, when
shaping the features of an environmental liability regime, it is important to look at the
reasons for the differences in transaction costs between the different systems, and to
avoid features that would in particular contribute to such costs.
Rules concerning direct access to justice by parties other than public authorities should
also be assessed in this light. The application of out-of-court solutions could be beneficial
in this context. Also clean up and restoration standards should be assessed in the light of
the costs theywould be likelyto generate.
In order to be able to deal with historic pollution and other forms of pollution for which
liability would not be a suitable instrument, for instance in case of diffuse damage, or in
cases where the polluter cannot be identified, Member States could use - as some already
28 See, for instance, the benchmark study ‘Jobs, Competitiveness and Environmental Regulation:
What are the real issues”, R. Repetto, World Resources Institute, March 1995.30
do - other instruments, such as impact fees levied on polluting activities, or funds
established at national or regional level.
8. CONCLUSION
This White Paper has sought to assess different options for Community action in the field
of environmental liability. On the basis of the analysis set out in this paper, the
Commission considers as the most appropriate option that of a Community framework
directive on environmental liability, providing for strict liability - with defences – with
respect to traditional damage (namely damage to health and property) and environmental
damage (contamination of sites and damage to biodiversity in Natura 2000 areas) caused
by EC regulated dangerous activities, and fault-based liability for damage to such
biodiversity caused by non-dangerous activities. This approach would provide the most
effective means of implementing the environmental principles of the EC Treaty, in
particular the polluter pays principle.
The details of such a framework directive should be further elaborated in the light of the
consultations to be held.
The Commission invites the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions as well as interested parties to discuss and
comment on the White Paper. Comments can be sent to the Commission, to the following
address:
Directorate General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection Legal Affairs
Unit (DG XI.B.3), Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Brussels, or sent by e-mail to
Carla.DEVRIES@cec.eu.int or Charlotta.COLLIANDER@cec.eu.int before
1 July 2000.